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ABSTRACT: This paper describes an effort to revise the PMFserv agent architecture in order to
implement J. J. Gibson’s Affordance Theory. The theoretical justification for this revision is
outlined along with the engineering constraints that inspired it. We describe the resulting
architectural changes and the impact of those changes on the flexibility, ease of rapid scenario
creation, and ability to reuse previous investments in knowledge engineering offered by our
architecture. The level of effort required to build a new scenario within PMFserv both with and
without the revisions suggested by Affordance Theory is compared. We conclude that Affordance
Theory is an elegant solution to the problem of providing both rapid scenario development and the
simulation of individual differences in perception, culture, and emotionality within the same agent
architecture.
1. Affordance Theory
Affordance Theory (AT) stems from origins
quite distinct from those of cognitive science,
and its modern interpretation is oftentimes the
subject of spirited debate. James J. Gibson [1]
coined the term “affordance”—one of a few
cornerstones central to his theory of ecological
psychology and direct perception. At the time,
although many sub-disciplines in cognitive
science were proceeding well as individual areas
of research, attempts to integrate and utilize
them in working systems—particularly in timeand resource-limited environments—met with
unsatisfactory
or
incoherent
results.
Increasingly complex mathematical approaches,
including non-monotonic reasoning, required
lengthy principled proofs that could not match
the performance or capabilities observed in
humans. In a typical model, perception and
attention were assumed to have occurred and the
emphasis was on the cognitive or mathematic

manipulation of symbols. In conventional AI,
anything considered relevant in the environment
also had to be represented and maintained in the
agent’s mind in order to keep the truth
maintenance essential to AI knowledge
representations coherent. Whatever existed in
the external world had to be replicated in the
internal “world model” of the mind. By
overlooking the processes of perception and
attention, the modeled agent acquired all the
information in the world, whether it was
relevant or not, in order to sustain truth
maintenance, and was riddled with problems
(e.g., [2], [3], [4]).
In a complementary way, perception is all that
Gibson seemed to want to write about—he
strongly opposed what he referred to as the
“computer bandwagon”. Although supported by
behavioral evidence, until the advent of situated
action, ecological psychology was without a

computational component (although cybernetics
certainly promoted ideas consistent with it).
Gibson’s notion of the affordance is based on a
more unified relationship between agent and
environment—form and function—more in
keeping with the Gestalt, or “transactional”
view [5]. Thus, salient, functional features
present in the environment lead to direct
sensation, perception, and action by the agent.
Any notion of information is functional or
situational,
involves
both
agent
and
environment,
and
the
affordance-based
relationship between the two. According to
Gibson, we perceive objects in terms of the
possibilities for action they offer, or afford, us.
The contour and shape of a coffee mug handle
affords grasping–lifting–drinking; a sidewalk
affords locomotion in a general direction; the
size, shape, placement, and features of the
Windows OK and CANCEL buttons afford
accepting or denying the current option, and so
on.
In this fashion, cognitive science and ecological
psychology (including AT) proceeded in these
forms largely in isolation from each other [6]
until the mid-1980s, when the two finally met in
the setting of AI planning, robotics, and game
playing. This union was referred to as “situated
action”. As a challenge, Agre and Chapman [7]
deliberately chose the video game environment
to stress the limited resources, quick decisions,
and perceptual processing required for
successful performance in that domain. In a
sense, these early pioneers were on the outside
of cognitive science and ecological psychology,
and were able to recognize what one had to
offer the other. With the sudden rearrangement
of the roles of agent, environment, perception,
and cognition, and a slight redefinition of
“causality”, “information”, and “context”,
agents could now reason in arbitrarily complex
environments.

In 1993, Vera and Simon [8] published a major
critique of situated action, claiming the
approach was simply a reification of
conventional symbolic cognitive science. Their
argument had merit, but was from the
Newtonian-interactional perspective.
In
physics, this would be tantamount to a theorist
attempting a Newtonian argument in Quantum
terms, or vice versa. What Vera and Simon
failed to explain is how Gibson’s notion of the
“stimulus flux”, for example, is transformed into
symbols, the stuff of cognition. Nor did they
understand the transactional, bi-directional,
acausal nature of the various perceptual and
cognitive
modules
in
situated
action
architectures versus the unidirectional causal
flow of control and data in conventional
symbolic architectures and the several instances
thereof. They also failed to point out why
situated action was required in the first place—
i.e., the computational intractability intrinsic to
symbolic architectures.
Although Simon’s
notion of bounded rationality is still a powerful
edifice in cognitive science and economics,
instances of the theory realized by his students
and others usually required unbounded
resources when approached from the
interactional perspective.
Since the formative years of situated action, the
theory of affordances has broadened within
cognitive science, which itself has evolved into
an alternate approach we refer to as “Situated
Cognitive Science” [9]. Given the requirements
of an agent-based architecture, there are those
aspects to which affordances pertain—namely,
perceptual aspects—and others to which they do
not—namely, symbolic manipulation.
The
current generation of agent architectures appears
to favor the hybrid approach, combining when
necessary performance moderator functions,
pattern-matching subsystems, rule-based subsystems, path-planning sub-systems, and so
forth (see also Hawkins and Chattam, in these
proceedings). For the purposes of modeling and
simulation the application of affordance theory

is more of a solution to an engineering problem
rather than a scientific problem.

agent was grounded in its own internal data
structures.

In addition to the architecture advanced in this
paper, the current generation of modeling and
simulation systems and other environments such
as The Sims (2002) and AI-Implant (Toth et al.,
Van Lent et al., in Hawkins and Chatam, in
these proceedings) makes use of affordances,
particularly sensory-perceptual affordances, and
appear to be best suited for meeting the subtle
demands of the environment, in the context of
its immediate surroundings. A Sims modeler,
who can even be a child (no Ph.D. required!),
programs the environment, not the agents. The
characters’ behaviors are the result of the
agents’ affordances or attunements to the
environment, not descriptions of what goes on
in their minds (see Clancey 1997, Part I, for a
discussion). The Soar cognitive architecture, on
the other hand, which is a symbolic processing
system, is better suited for short-, medium-, and
longer-term reasoning in keeping with its
longstanding tradition of manipulating postperceptual information.

This is a common design for intelligent agents.
It reflects
our understanding of human cognition as the
manipulation of mental models [10]. If people
each carry within themselves a functional
representation of the objects in their
environment – a robust mental model of the
world maintained by perceptual information –
shouldn’t AI programs intended to traverse and
manipulate a virtual landscape possess a similar
structure? In a traditional strategic simulation
involving perfectly rational actors, such a
capacity is overkill. In a simulation that takes
social dynamics into account, however, where
individual points of view are significantly
different and agents act with less than perfect
knowledge of the world, such a capacity is a
basic requirement. In order to begin to capture
the subtleties of social interaction or simulate
human emotionality, agents must act based on
their own unique socio-cultural background and
personal experience.

This new trend in modeling, simulation, and
gaming, is very promising. The following
sections will describe how AT, standard
symbolic cognition, economic utility theory,
culture, and emotions can be combined in new
and innovative ways to take advantage of the
best features from all of these approaches.

Take as an example an American helicopter
flying over Mogadishu in Somalia in 1992. For
some Somalis, the helicopter was a threatening
menace that blew women’s skirts above their
knees and ripped babies from their arms. For
Mohamed Fararah Addid’s clansmen the
helicopter contained their enemies and
persecutors. For the US Rangers and Special
Forces stationed in Somalia the helicopter was a
means of transport and a source of support. As
a result of these distinct representations a
successful attack on the helicopter would result
in distinct emotions for the different groups
mentioned above. Onlookers might feel fear,
joy, or anger as a result of the event, and would
subsequently select their actions on the basis of
those feelings. Each would tell a different story
if asked to describe the event, because each
would perceive the event through the lens of
their own unique personal and social history.

2. Why affordance theory?
Our interest in the use of Affordance Theory in
multi-agent systems arose from engineering
constraints
rather
than
a
theoretical
predisposition.
Agents created in earlier
revisions of our architecture each contained a
functional representation of every other object
in its environment and made its decisions by
consulting this internal schema.
State
information was passed between agents and the
environment, but every decision made by an

Representing these different points of view is
especially important in a military simulation, as
without differing points of view there would be
no conflict at all! For a simulation grounded in
emotion simulating differences in point of view
is an absolute requirement.
Unfortunately, representing those distinct points
of view is a nightmare for developers, as the
time and effort required to create an individual
knowledge representation for each agent in such
a system grows exponentially as additional
agents and objects are added. Each agent
contains a unique semantic markup of the world
describing every perceived object in terms of
the agent’s own cultural and emotional history.
To add a new object to that world, each and
every agent would need to be revised to include
this object and the actions available as a result
of its presence into their individual semantic
markup. With a simulation containing more than
just a few agents, such a solution is untenable.
Affordance Theory offers an elegant solution to
this problem. If the semantic markup of the
objects in the environment is contained within
and broadcast by the objects themselves rather
than the agents perceiving them, then agents and
objects can be added independently.
A
simulation developer adding a new agent type to
the system need not worry about what agents or
objects are already instantiated. The objects in
the simulation will broadcast their affordances,
or the actions that they afford to the agent in
combination with some measure of the
anticipated results of those actions, to any new
agent, allowing it to manipulate them with no a
priori knowledge of that object whatsoever.
Affordances cannot be uniform for all agents.
Each agent must still have a unique view of the
objects in its environment. The affordance
approach offers two possibilities for introducing
individual differences in perception. The first is
to have multiple perceptual types for each
object, accompanied by perception rules that

determine which type is active for any given
agent. For example, the helicopter object might
contain a rule set that tests the allegiance of the
agent perceiving it. If the perceiving agent is an
American, it will be perceived as a friendly
helicopter. If the perceiving agent is a member
of Addid’s clan, it will be perceived as an
enemy helicopter. These perceptual types will
provide different actions and anticipated effects.
For an American the helicopter might offer
extraction from a dangerous situation, whereas
for the Somali it might offer a ready target. The
second possibility is to provide some
mechanism in each agent that will automatically
modify or interpret the affordance according to
some property internal to the agent. For
example, an agent system might be devised that
categorized actions in terms of certain central
goals. If a helicopter object affords the action
“attack,” this action might be defined in terms
of its respective success and failure on the
opposing goals “Kill Americans” and “Protect
Americans.” The American agent will prefer
actions that succeed at “Protect Americans” and
fail at “Kill Americans” whereas the Somali
agent will prefer actions with the opposite
pattern of results. Despite a uniform affordance,
the agents interpret the actions available to them
differently based on internal data.
We feel that the best approach is a union of
these two possibilities. Each perceivable object
(including agents) should contain a variety of
perceptual types representing fundamentally
different
perceptions
of
that
object.
Concurrently, each agent should contain a
system for interpreting the actions afforded by
each object according to its own properties.
3. Methodology
The knowledge engineering necessitated by this
approach is by no means trivial, though it is far,
far less time-intensive than would be required
for an emotional agent system without
affordances. Every agent and object must be

wrapped in a semantic markup that fully
specifies the available perceptual types, the
perception rules, and the set of affordances
belonging to each perceptual type. Furthermore,
agents must be populated with parameters or
properties through which they can create
individualized responses to common afforded
options. Much of the knowledge engineering
required to build an emotional agent system
without using affordances is still required for an
affordance-based approach. The benefits come
when a simulation developer needs to add a new
agent, add or remove an object, or change the
behavior of an agent.
Furthermore, an
affordance-based system will benefit from the
creation of libraries of pre-constructed agents
and objects. Using such a library it should be
possible to build a new scenario extremely
quickly. By facilitating the reuse of agents and
objects, the creation of a new scenario can be
accomplished with a minimum of additional
programming effort or knowledge engineering.
It should be noted that our architecture describes
decision-making only. Once a decision is made,
action execution is simulation-specific. This
approach should therefore be theoretically
applicable to any simulation in which human or
agent decision-making plays a role.
The
granularity of the decisions is of no
consequence, assuming that the actions under
consideration can be wrapped according to our
specifications.
In fact, multiple levels of
granularity could co-exist in the same system.
For example, a commander agent might make
strategic decisions about troop placement while
those under his command decide how to act
given his orders.
3.1 Scenario Design
The following section will outline a basic
methodology for designing a scenario from
scratch in an affordance-based agent
architecture. This methodology should apply
irrespective of the simulation environment in

which it is deployed and the level of granularity
at which decisions are being made by the
agents.
In keeping with our Mogadishu
examples above, we will use an example miniscenario loosely drawn from Mark Bowden’s
book Black Hawk Down. In this scenario, a
helicopter has crashed in Mogadishu leaving
one surviving pilot. A crowd, comprised of
armed militia and civilians, is advancing on the
crash site.
Step1: Create Agent/Object Inventory -Generating a complete list of agents and objects
is crucial, as an agent will only be able to
perform an action if that action is made
available to it by an object in the scenario. The
inventory should therefore contain not only
physical objects but also composite (e.g.
crowds, squads, etc) and conceptual (e.g. orders
that can be followed, etc) objects as called for
by the specific demands of the scenario. If
objects can be in different physical states over
the course of the scenario, and those different
states afford completely different opportunities
for action, then they might be represented by
multiple objects that replace each other when
the state changes. For example, a dead body
should be a different object than its living
counterpart.
As our example scenario is simple and only
loosely based on actual events, the inventory of
objects and agents is quite short. We will need
at least the following objects:
Crashed_Helicopter, Pilot,
Dead_Pilot, Militia_Member,
Dead_Militia_Member,
Civilian_Man,
Dead_Civilian_Man,
Civilian_Woman,
Dead_Civilian_Woman, Building,
Rubble,Rifle, Pistol, and Grenade.
Our example is simple enough to avoid the need
for conceptual objects, but we might have added

an orders object for the Militia_Member
agents that specified that the pilot should be
captured alive and held as a hostage.
Step 2: Identify Perceptual Type for Each
Object/Agent--Each simulated object should
contain a set of perceptual types that describe
the variety of perceptions of that object
available to other agents. The list of perceptual
types reflects every distinct manner in which an
object can be perceived, so it is quite important
to specify a full list.
For our example scenario, we will examine just
two objects: Pilot and Civilian_Woman.
The pilot object could be perceived by a
sympathetic
Somali
as
a
friendly_american_soldier, by other
Somalis as a hostile_foreign_soldier,
by militia members as an enemy_soldier,
by
some
militia
members
as
a
potential_hostage, or by a fellow
American as a compatriot. Dependent on
the status of Pilot, he might also be perceived
as a combatant_enemy, or as an
unarmed_american_soldier, etc.
One of the issues that American soldiers faced
in Somalia was the frequent use of women and
children as human shields by Somali
combatants. The Civilian_Woman object
might therefore include a set of perceptual types
that represent this behavior in the simulation.
An
American
soldier
might
view
Civilian_Woman
as
an
innocent_bystander, a human_shield,
or an enemy_combatant depending on her
current activity. Other agents might perceive
her as a friend, a woman, a
potential_human_shield,
or
an
active_human_shield.
Step 3: Codify Afforded Actions -- Each
perceptual type for any given object should
offer a set of possible actions and the results of

those actions anticipated by the agent perceiving
that object. These anticipated results need to be
presented in a format that can be readily
understood and interpreted by all agents in the
simulation. For example, results might be
presented in terms of the degree to which they
satisfy a predetermined set of needs common to
all agents (though not necessarily weighted
equally by all agents). For the purposes of this
general explanation we will assume that our
agents understand the results of actions in terms
of a series of goals: safety, self-esteem, and
glory. Each of the anticipated results should be
described in terms of these three goals.
Continuing with our earlier example, the
Pilot object, we can define the actions
available
for
the
hostile_foreign_soldier,
enemy_soldier,
and
unarmed
_hostile_foreign_soldier perceptual
types. The hostile_foreign_soldier
perceptual type represents the perception of
those that oppose the American presence but are
not actively fighting against it. The available
actions
could
be
Pilot.hostile_foreign_soldier
.attack(), which might fail considerably on
safety and succeed a small amount on glory, and
Pilot.hostile_foreign_soldier.fl
ee_from(), which might succeed on safety
and fail on glory and self esteem.
The
unarmed_hostile_foreign_soldier
actions
would
look
similar:
Pilot.unarmed_hostile_foreign_so
ldier .attack() might fail only a small
amount on safety but succeed considerably on
self
esteem,
while
Pilot.unarmed_hostile_foreign_so
ldier.taunt() might only succeed a little
bit
on
esteem.
Pilot.enemy
_soldier.attack() might succeed on
glory and self esteem but fail on safety, while
Pilot.enemy _soldier.flee_from()
might succeed on safety but fail considerably on
glory and self esteem.

An agent who sees the Pilot as an
enemy_soldier and an agent who sees the
Pilot
as
an
hostile_foreign
_soldier would therefore both have the
option to flee from the Pilot, though they
would attribute a different pattern of goal
success and failure to that action. Even agents
who saw the Pilot as the same perceptual type
might have different responses to the same
pattern of goal successes and failures.
The choices made in the process of knowledgeengineering an affordance-based agent system
should reflect as accurately and completely as
possible the various perceptions of each object
that real people would experience - and the
variety of choices that real people would
encounter - were they in the scenario
themselves. We recommend extensive literature
review and the consultation of SMEs (subject
matter experts) as a starting point for developing
the semantic markup of the agents and objects in
the world. The final list, though hopefully
inspired by valid data, will invariably be
dictated in large measure by common sense and
by the perceptual types necessary to support
specific behaviors that scenario developers may
want to simulate in their systems.
4. Case Study – PMFserv Scenarios Before
AT and After AT
PMFserv was conceived as a software product
that would expose a large library of well
established and data-grounded Performance
Moderator Functions (PMFs) and Human
Behavior Representations (HBRs) for use by
cognitive architectures deployed in a variety of
simulation environments. Its principal feature
has been and continues to be a model of
decision-making based on emotional subjective
utility constrained by stress and physiology
[13]. PMFserv quickly grew to become an
agent architecture in its own right – with the
flexibility to either act as a meta-level emotional

arbitrator for others’ cognitive architectures or
provide a fully functional stand-alone system to
simulate human decision making.
4.1 PMFserv Architecture
PMFserv is built around a blackboard data
structure loosely corresponding to a short-term
or working memory system. Modular PMF
subsystems manipulate data contained both in
the blackboard and in a long-term memory
store. Information is layered on the blackboard
such that each layer is dependent on the layers
below it for a given decision cycle of the agent
(see Figure 1).
Generic PMFserv Agent
Long Term Memory

Doctrine Ruleset

PMF Module Scheduler

Blackboard
(Working Memory)

Chosen action

Decision PMFs

}

Goal Hierarchy

Standards Hierarchy

Emotion PMFs

Perception PMFs
Agent Memory

Need Reservoir
Values
Coping style

Memory
Relationships
Physical Props

Decay Parameters

Calculated Emotions
Perceived Object
List

Preference Hierarchy

Stress Thresholds

Calculated Utilities

Stress PMFs

Stress Reservoir
Physiology Reservoir

Figure 1 – PMFserv Overview
Walking up the blackboard from the bottom up
reveals the decision cycle of a single agent.
Physiological data across a range of measures
(including arousal, fatigue, hunger, thirst, injury,
etc) are combined to set the levels of a series of
stress reservoirs. The stress reservoirs then
determine the agent’s coping style (a measure of
the agent’s current awareness and capacity for
rational thought) for the current decision cycle.
Need reservoirs corresponding to the degree to
which the agent has satisfied the needs outlined
by Maslow [11] are set based on any action that
might have occurred in between decision cycles.
At this point Affordance Theory begins to play a
prominent role in the decision cycle. Based on
the agent’s coping style, physiology, and any

memory elements that might have been created
prior to the current cycle, each object in the
system executes its perception rules to
determine which objects are currently
perceivable by the agent and generates a list of
the perceptual types and corresponding
affordances currently available to the agent.
These affordances are represented in terms of
the agent’s emotion model. Our emotion model,
abbreviated here as OCC in homage to the trio
of psychologists Ortony, Clure, and Collins [12]
who proposed it, is described in great detail in
numerous
other
papers
(available
at
http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~barryg) so our
discussion here will be brief. The general idea
is that an agent posses three hierarchical
concern trees that describe the agent’s Goals for
Action, Standards for Behavior, and Preferences
for
People,
Objects,
and
Situations,
respectively. An action can be represented by a
series of successes and failures on the sub-nodes
of these three trees. Each sub-goal is given a
weight that describes how much it contributes to
its parent node. To determine the emotional
utility of an action, the OCC model multiplies
the degree of success and failure of each node
up the trees. From the top nodes on each tree,
11 pairs of oppositely valenced emotions are
generated. By summing those emotions we
arrive at a utility value for the action under
consideration. This process is completed for
every afforded action available to the agent.
The action with the highest utility value is
chosen and executed.
The OCC model allows for a common set of
Goals, Standards, and Preference trees whose
structure is shared by all agents. The weights,
however, are unique for each agent. We are
therefore able to give each agent a robust and
individual worldview.
We have tried to
construct the trees to allow for the
representation of as wide a variety as possible of
cultural, ideological, and personal backgrounds
as possible.

4.2 Scenarios Built Before Affordance Theory
Before the current set of revisions, our
architecture looked significantly different. A
full description of the original architecture is
available in [13] and at our website. The basic
functionality of the OCC model itself was not
fundamentally different from its current
incarnation, although each agent was given its
own unique set of trees. An agent’s decisions,
however, were driven by internal Markov chains
that represented every possible state of the
world as far as the agent was concerned. Each
state was tied to a set of successes or failures on
its OCC tree nodes that provided a means to
evaluate which states were preferable to others.
As in the current system, the agent’s physiology
contributed to a stress value that determined the
agents coping style. Rather than influence the
agents’ perception, however, coping style
served to constrain how far into possible future
states the agent would look in order to calculate
emotional utility. Whenever one agent could
affect the state of another agent, a forced state
change would occur. Our agents had no
capacity for anticipating such a forced change.
They acted as though they were the lone actor in
a static world.
A number of demonstration scenarios were built
using this architecture. The earliest was an
ambush at a school bus inspired by the fourth
dream depicted in General Paul Gorman’s In
Defense of Fombler’s Ford.
The second
simulated the target selection procedures of a
Terrorist group. Shortly thereafter a number of
scenarios were built that depicted crowd scenes.
Each featured a crowd that had gathered to
protest a social injustice. In one series of
scenarios this injustice was a roadblock that
kept people from going to work. In several
others it was a protest outside of a prison. All of
these scenarios featured similar characters: a
group of protesters comprised of both females
and males, employed and unemployed, a police

presence, a group of onlookers, and an instigator
or two trying to rouse the crowd.
It was during the development of these
scenarios that the limitations of our approach
became apparent. Despite the fact that the
characters involved in the scenes were virtually
identical from scenario to scenario, they had to
be built from scratch each time to accommodate
new agents, objects, or behaviors. To produce
meaningful, scenario-specific behavior the
agents’ Markov chains needed to include sets of
states that could represent the specific, complex
social dynamics present in each scenario.
Furthermore, the OCC trees needed to be highly
customized and tuned to produce believable
behavior for any given Markov chain. While
we were producing stand-alone, unique
scenarios this was not a problem. As soon as
we started to build related scenarios with shared
characters, however, we realized that there was
no way our architecture could support rapid
scenario development or facilitate the editing of
scenarios. Agents built with static Markov
chains could not be easily edited. The addition
of a new object or agent necessitated a revised
Markov chain and OCC tree set for every
existing agent in the scenario.
We came to the conclusion that the only way to
design a rapidly composable system of social,
emotional agents was to decouple all knowledge
of the world from the agents’ internal data
structures and somehow generate that
knowledge
automatically
at
runtime.
Affordance Theory was the obvious choice for
doing so, as it allowed complete encapsulation
of the knowledge necessary to manipulate
objects in the world within those objects
themselves. In essence, we are using Affordance
Theory as a software engineering shortcut.
Rather than build mental models on a per-agent
basis we allow those models to be generated at
runtime based on the objects present in the
environment at the time. This allows us to build
agents that can respond to very complex

situations without having to painstakingly
design those complexities into their Markov
chains from the start.
Take, for example, the simple Mogadishu
scenario that we began to sketch in our new
architecture in Section 3. Before we moved to
our
current
affordance-based
approach,
developing a similar scenario would have
involved the following effort:
Step 1: Generate a list of all agents, objects, and
events involved in the scenario. -- The level of
effort here was equivalent to the level of effort
required using the affordance-based approach,
assuming that there are no pre-existing agents or
objects that we could pull from a library or
otherwise reuse.
Step 2: For each agent type, develop a complete
Markov chain describing the agent’s possible
states and valid state transitions -- Because
events or actions were described in terms of the
actor rather than the recipient of the action,
there was a greater tendency to oversimplify
scenarios and omit critical events, which
necessitated lengthy revisions. As a result the
process of crafting Markov chains was iterative
and tedious. It was also quite limiting. Events
could only occur in certain sequences prespecified by the Markov chain. If that event did
not unfold as planned, a revision was necessary
for every agent whose states were affected by
the event.
In our new system, we do not need to create a
static state-space for each agent, as the agents’
possible actions are determined at run-time by
the objects in the environment. The available
actions are coded into each object only once
rather than repeatedly describing all actions
available to each agent. Very little needs to be
“pre-scripted” so the emergence of a far greater
range of behaviors and outcomes is possible.
Because the development cycle of an agent
ceases to be an iterative, trial-and-error process,

and because actions are coded on a per-object
rather than a per-agent basis, the time and effort
required for this step is vastly reduced in our
new architecture.
Step 3: Design unique concern trees that
correspond to each agent’s Markov chain --In
the old system a new tree needed to be
constructed for every agent. Each agent then
required its weights to be set and validated.
This process was repeated every time a
significant change was made to the Markov
chain to accommodate new possibilities for
action.
In the current system the trees themselves are
static. We developed a common concern set
that all agents possess. Only the weights need
to be set on a per-agent basis. Though the
resulting concern trees are significantly larger
than their predecessors, they provide a
systematic framework for describing individual
differences in culture and belief systems
between agents that maintains the ability to
produce unique agents present in our earlier
architecture. As a result, each agent or agent
type developed under our new architecture
requires merely a new set of weights, not an
entirely new tree. Because the tree structure
itself requires no revision or tweaking during
scenario development the effort required for this
step is significantly reduced in our new
architecture.
Step 4: Implement the execution of all events in
code along with forced state transitions -- The
effort required here is equivalent.
The
simulation environment, not PMFserv, handles
the execution of actions. In our earlier demos
we built our own simple simulation environment
for analysis and testing, but we are now working
to integrate our agent architecture with external
simulation systems that handle action execution
themselves.

In summary, then, the effort required to develop
a scenario has been drastically reduced by the
implementation of affordance theory within our
architecture. A certain level of subject matter
research and knowledge engineering will always
be required to develop valid, complex agent
scenarios.
However, our new approach
eliminates redundant knowledge structures and
greatly facilitates the reuse of previously
implemented and validated agents and objects.
4.3 Subsequent Work
To help us better understand the knowledge
engineering demands imposed by our new
system, we enlisted the help of a group of
Systems Engineering students who were looking
for a project that would fulfill their senior
design requirement. These students spent a
semester designing a scenario that could be
implemented in our system, though the system
itself is still under development. This included
an extensive literature review of the events
depicted in the book “Black Hawk Down.” The
students were asked to extract several key agent
types, derive weights for the standards, goals,
and preference trees along with documented
justification for those weights, and construct a
limited ontology of objects in their scenario
along with their perceptual types and
affordances. By observing their effort we
gained some insight into the level of effort that
will be required to build up a large library of
validated agents and object presets.
The very fact that we were able to “outsource”
the development of a scenario to a student team
demonstrates a major advantage of Affordance
Theory.
In our previous architecture the
development cycle was iterative and confusing
as a result of the interdependencies between
agents, objects, and their environment. Students
were not able to create scenarios in this system
without quite a bit of hand-holding. Because
the objects now contain their own data,
however, scenario components can be

developed in relative isolation from each other
without having an impact on the overall
scenario development.

5. Conclusion
We are currently working to provide a
standards-based interface that would allow
PMFserv to drive the behavior of agents situated
in a variety of simulation and game
environments. We envision PMFserv as a
multipurpose toolkit from which simulation
developers will be able to either drag-and-drop
agent minds onto the agent bodies in their
simulations or use specific PMF components as
needed to moderate the behavior of their own
cognitive sub-systems.
The initial test bed for this effort is a joint
project with a group at ICT. We are developing
a hybrid architecture that uses PMFserv to
moderate decisions made by SOAR agents
within the Unreal game engine. AI-Implant is
being used to manage art resources and provide
low-level implementations of actions that can be
triggered by SOAR or PMFserv directly (e.g.
navigation, movement, physical actions, etc.).
By exploring ways of tying these systems
together, we will increase our understanding of
the requirements for integration significantly.
This demonstration will set the stage for future
integration efforts with real-world simulation
systems and provide valuable insight into the
requirements for behavioral interchange
standards that we will be able to share with
others attempting similar efforts.
Revising our agent architecture to support AT
was by no means a trivial effort. A fundamental
redesign was required to include AT at every
level. The work was well worth it, however.
Without AT scenarios were more difficult to
design and debug. We struggled and failed to
find an elegant solution to provide rapid

scenario development capabilities and the
construction of libraries to facilitate agent reuse.
As a result of our redesign, these
capabilities have become a cornerstone of our
architecture and our agents themselves are able
to exhibit far more complex, emergent
behaviors than was previously possible.
Affordance Theory is by no means a panacea for
simulation developers, however. As a theory of
cognition it is far from being accepted.
Architectures that are designed to be unified
theories of cognition unto themselves or that
model expert performance (SOAR, ACT-R, etc)
would be better off employing a perception
model with a stronger physiological grounding.
Conversely, AT would probably be overkill for
most cellular automata or other artificial life
simulations.
For multi-agent systems that
simulate the cognition and/or emotionality of
individual agents, and that aspire to a high
degree of reuse and rapid composability,
however, AT is practically a requirement.
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